The Political Economy of Trade Protection by Joseph P. Kalt
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Political Economy of Trade Protection
Volume Author/Editor: Anne O. Krueger, Editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-45491-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/krue96-2
Conference Date: September 13, 1994
Publication Date: January 1996
Chapter Title: Do Precedent and Legal Argument Matter in the Lumber CVD
Cases?
Chapter Author: Joseph P. Kalt
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8721
Chapter pages in book: (p. 51 - 60)5  Do Precedent and Legal 
Argument Matter in the Lumber 
CVD Cases? 
Joseph P.  Kalt 
5.1  Rational Political Economy and U.S.-Canadian  Lumber Disputes 
Efforts by interested parties to secure trade protection are frequently carried 
out in the United  States through the quasi-judicial regulatory  framework of 
countervailing duty (CVD) law, as administered by  the Department of  Com- 
merce (DOC). Parties  who participate in the department’s litigation  process, 
however, often confess to perceptions that the process is a charade; the hearings 
and filings before the department’s International Trade Administration (ITA) 
and International Trade Commission (ITC) have no influence on the ultimate 
policy outcomes. Instead, it is averred, the policy outcomes are driven by inter- 
est group politics, leaving the litigatory  apparatus to serve merely as beside- 
the-fact  packaging  for  decisions  made  elsewhere  and  through  different, 
“purely political” processes. 
This paper tries to get at the questions of whether and how the quasi-judicial 
regulatory  process by  which CVD law is administered affects the success or 
failure of parties petitioning for protection. The ongoing dispute between the 
United States and Canada over trade in lumber and logs serves as the context.’ 
The “timber trade  war” centers on claims by U.S. milling interests that the 
Canadians provide publicly  owned trees to loggers at subsidized prices, and 
that Canadian log export restraints subsidize the prices that Canadian sawmills 
pay for raw logs. 
This research  focuses on the role that a particular legal institution-legal 
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precedent-plays  in determining the successes and failures of the contending 
parties as they tussle over such matters as the applicability of CVD law. Legal 
precedent is treated as a costly barrier that litigants face when trying to exert 
political influence. Resources are expended by competing parties to defend or 
break down precedents in a stochastic process of “take your best shot (via legal 
argument) and hope you hit the bull’s-eye.’’ What arguments work and why? 
At some risk of caricature, economic theories of rational political economy 
are currently pulling scholars into two broad camps: Capture Theory (CT) and 
the New Institutionalism (NI). Under the former, it is argued that political out- 
comes can be explained by a combination of  two primary economic factors: 
(1) the differential stakes that contending parties have in a particular  law or 
regulation, that is, where the rents are; and (2) the differential costs of effective 
political organization that contending rent-seeking interest groups confront as 
a result of standard Olsonian forces of free riding2 Within  this  framework, 
regulatory  outcomes  and  processes  are  “captured”  by  successful  interest 
groups who wield the most effective political influence, where “influence” is 
usually  measured either by votes delivered to politicians or votes plus cam- 
paign contributions delivered to politicians. 
The New Institutionalism does not deny that the two primary factors under- 
lying CT are indeed important (if not strictly “primary”), but adds a third fun- 
damental explanatory factor to efforts to understand political outcomes. This 
factor is the institutional context-laws,  procedures, precedents, regulations, 
voting rules, and so on-that  forms the playing field upon which contending 
rent seekers meet. NI lays claim to every bit as much economic rationality in 
the modeling of political actors as does CT, but argues that institutional struc- 
ture constitutes binding constraints, or at least conditioning costs, that limit the 
range of actors’ investments in political outcomes and hence play determina- 
tive roles in political  outcome^.^ 
As these theories play out in the investigation of a particular class of political 
action, such as decisions of the ITA regarding trade protection for U.S. lumber 
interests, they carry testably different implications. According to CT, institu- 
tions such as legal proceedings are “Stiglerian theater”; the real game is being 
played  out behind  the  scenes of  the  hearing  rooms by  interest  groups  and 
support-maximizing  politician^.^ Legal rulings and such matters as precedent 
may be a language by which the game is explained or justified after the fact to 
appease the press and the public, but they are not determinative of outcomes. 
NI would hold, however, that such institutions as precedent, standards of evi- 
dence, and burdens of proof matter;  agency decision makers and judges can’t 
simply ignore precedent, evidence, or procedure no matter how much political 
2. The classic statements here are from the Chicago School: Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), 
3. See, e.g., North (1990), Bates (1988). and the writings of the ‘‘rational  political economists.” 
4. The nature of such support maximization  is worked out for the case of  no principal-agent 
Becker (1983). 
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clout the beseeching interest group has. If a group does not have a good argu- 
ment by  which to satisfy or overcome precedent, or meet its evidentiary bur- 
den, it runs a substantial risk  of  losing before the  agencies and the courts. 
Within  the  New  Institutionalism, precedents  should be  “stronger”-that  is, 
harder for an opposing party to overcome, or easier for a supporting party to 
uphold-the  longer and more frequently they have withstood previous  chal- 
lenges and have been reaffirmed by appropriate authorities, and the more clear 
the underlying legislative intent andor directive is. 
Below I identify a set of stakes-bearing issues that have been adjudicated by 
the ITA  in the latest round of  the U.S.-Canada lumber dispute. These issues 
can be categorized according to whom-the  U.S. petitioners or the Canadi- 
ans-has  won each of them as of the ITA’s  Final Determination, reached in 
May  1992. This  creates  a dichotomous  winner-loser  variable  by  which  to 
gauge the outcome of the legal proceedings. For each of the arguments in the 
data set, I then code the stakes at issue in the argument for their magnitude 
(large or  small), and dichotomously code the argument of  the winning party 
for  its  consistency  with  precedent,  its  analytic  or  theoretical  straightfor- 
wardness,  the  strength  of  the  winner’s evidence, and the ease of  exposition 
entailed by the winner’s argument. The pseudoregression Boolean techniques 
pioneered by Ragin (1987) are used to reduce the panel of dichotomous data 
to its parsimonious informational content in terms of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for an argument’s success before the ITA. The test then is whether 
a party’s success in making an argument can be systematically explained as a 
function of determinants of the seventy of the beseeching party’s precedential 
burden or other institutional aspects of the legal proceedings (per NI theory). 
That is, are particular  institutional configurations (e.g., favorable precedent) 
part of the set of necessary andor sufficient conditions needed to make a spe- 
cific argument a winner? Or is success unrelated to apparent precedential bur- 
dens and the institutional context of the legal proceedings, being instead driven 
solely by parties’ stakes in the matter (per CT theory)? 
An illustration is helpful to explain the nature of the arguments in the lumber 
dispute. The U.S. lumber industry has long argued that the Canadian federal 
and provincial governments provide the rights to cut trees (“stumpage” rights) 
at below-market prices to Canadian loggers, and that this constitutes a counter- 
vailable  subsidy to lumber production in  Canada. Economists  testifying on 
behalf of the Canadians (e.g., William Nordhaus of Yale University) and econ- 
omists researching the matter independently (e.g., Kalt 1 9885)  have argued that 
the evidence and the theory indicate that to the extent Canadian stumpage may 
be below market, the consequence is merely an inframarginal transfer of Ricar- 
dian and Hotelling rents to loggers. The supply of logs and hence lumber is left 
unchanged. U.S. lumber producers therefore face no incremental competitive 
5.  This research was undertaken  and published prior to any engagement with any party to the 
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pressure from Canadian lumber producers and are not harmed by  Canadian 
stumpage policy. 
This argument has held little or no sway before the ITA or the ITC. Concepts 
of inframarginality and rent appear to be difficult to comprehend, and the argu- 
ment has been dismissed as irrelevant and obfuscating theorizing by university 
economists. Moreover, although they have offered considerable empirical evi- 
dence for their case, little or no precedent has supported the Canadians’ argu- 
ment for exempting “subsidies” that are inframarginal from the definition of 
the kinds of subsidies that CVD actions are designed to counteract. The stakes 
in the issue are very large, since exemption of inframarginal subsidies would 
put an end to the U.S. interests’ case for CVD action against Canadian stump- 
age policies. In fact, the U.S. interests have won the issue before the ITA as of 
the  1992 Final Determination. It appears that, in the absence of precedent on 
the Canadians’ side, their economic theorizing and empirical evidence are to 
no avail. 
This single case suggests that precedent matters. The Boolean analysis of 
this study will reject this  suggestion, however, if  other sample points  (argu- 
ments) show the U.S. interests winning when the pattern for such variables as 
the strength of  the Canadians’ evidence, the difficulty of exposition, and the 
size of  stakes is the same as in the case of  the inframarginal stumpage argu- 
ment, but precedent is on the Canadians’ side (i.e., unlike the inframarginal 
stumpage argument). That is, if the U.S. interests are observed winning argu- 
ments with large stakes, whether or not precedent is on their side (and holding 
other explanatory factors constant across arguments), it cannot be concluded 
that precedent matters in the NI sense. 
5.2  Lumber I, 11,111: History and Issues 
Over  the  past  dozen  years,  Canadian  softwood  lumber  imports  have 
prompted three separate CVD inquiries. The first round of the timber  trade 
war-Lumber  I-was  launched in 1982. It ended upon a final negative deter- 
mination in  1983, with the DOC finding that Canadian stumpage rights were 
allocated in a way that failed to satisfy the technical legal criterion of “speci- 
ficity” (which requires that a subsidy be provided to a specific enterprise or 
industry, or group of enterprises or industries, in order for such a subsidy to be 
countervailable). 
Lumber I1 arose in 1986 in response to a petition for investigation of Cana- 
dian stumpage policy by the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI), a trade 
organization  and  lobbying  group  representing  (predominantly)  small  and 
medium-size U.S. sawmill companies. Consistent with evolving precedent (in 
unrelated cases) that broadened the definition of “specificity,” the DOC found 
that the Canadian stumpage system was both “specific” (in the sense described 
above) and  “preferential” (i.e., it “distorted” the marketplace for lumber by 
affecting the supply schedule of Canadian lumber). The DOC set the counter- 55  Do Precedent and Legal Argument Matter in the Lumber CVD Cases? 
vailing duty rate for Canadian lumber imports at 14.5 percent ad valorem. The 
Lumber I1 CVD was effectively preempted, however, when escalating retalia- 
tory threats by the Canadians compelled the United States and Canada to enter 
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The Lumber I1 MOU obligated 
Canada to impose a 15 percent fee on softwood lumber exports to the United 
States.6 
In 199  1, Canada and a number of its provinces concluded that the MOU had 
been satisfied and lifted the 15 percent export fee. The DOC’S  ITA immediately 
launched Lumber 111  to investigate whether Canadian stumpage policies con- 
tinued to constitute a countervailable subsidy. At the invitation of the ITA, the 
Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports filed submissions arguing that Canada’s log 
export restraints (LERs) also constitute a countervailable subsidy.’ On Final 
Determination in  1992, the ITA found both Canadian stumpage and LERs to 
be  countervailable and  set an ad valorem  CVD of  6.51 percent  for lumber 
imported into the United States from Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and 
Quebec. As of  1994, the Final Determination was subject to ongoing appeal 
before  a  binational  panel  created  pursuant  to  the  recent  US.-Canada free 
trade agreement. 
The stakes in the lumber dispute are large. Duties on the order of 5 percent 
to 15 percent translate into hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Lumber 
11,  for example, concerned only stumpage, yet it has been estimated that its 
CVD would have produced (i.e., but for the MOU) tariff revenues of more than 
$340 million  per year for the United States, and net gains for U.S. lumber 
producers of more than $400 million per year.8 In the case of Lumber 111,  the 
duties set forth by the ITA’s  Final Determination would offset alleged subsidies 
totaling more than $390 million per year. 
These stakes obviously motivate the contending parties. The tariff-seeking 
interests  throughout  Lumber  I,  11,  and  111  have  consisted  of  medium  and 
smaller U.S.  logging and milling operations organized as the Coalition for Fair 
Lumber Imports, joined with force by at least one of the very large U.S. opera- 
tors  (Georgia Pacific Corporation),  and orchestrated by  a U.S. law firm re- 
nowned for lobbying and legal efforts on behalf of protection-seeking parties. 
A number of large US.-based operators, such as Weyerhauser, have been ex- 
panding their investments in Canada. This apparently has tended to cool any 
enthusiasm  for CVD action against Canadian  lumber  imports. U.S. lumber 
consumers (who stand to lose from tariffs on Canadian lumber) have largely 
been inactive in the lumber dispute. The active opposition to CVD action has 
consistently come from Canadian sawmills and the Canadian government.  In 
particular, participation  in the legal proceedings  has primarily been  led and 
6. See Kalt (1988) for a discussion and calculation of the international welfare effects of Lum- 
7. Ironically, since Lumber 11,  the  United States had  tightened log export restrictions of  its 
8. See Kalt (1988). 
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Table 5.1  Hypothetical Boolean Summary Table (upper case = presence; 
lower case = absence) 







financed by  the provincial forestry ministries. Canadian mill operators have 
cooperated with their governmental agents. 
5.3  Boolean Representation of the Legal Arguments in Lumber I11 
The tariff-seeking  U.S. interests  have  been  the  most  influential  party  in 
Lumber 111, in the sense that they have won their case before the ITA-but  this 
does not explain why they won. As noted, I use the Boolean pseudoregression 
techniques pioneered  by  Ragin  to investigate  the factors that might  explain 
what makes a winning argument in the Lumber  I11 CVD proceedings before 
the ITA.9 Boolean analysis proceeds by coding an outcome of interest for di- 
chotomous results. In the case at hand, the outcome of an argument is coded 
Win or Lose. Possible explanatory factors in determining when  an outcome 
(eg,  Win) occurs are coded for their presence or absence. The resulting coding 
can be represented by a table of the kind illustrated above. 
Boolean analysis describes the outcome in the first case (row) as Y = aB. 
The second case is coded as Y = AB. Multiplication in Boolean analysis is 
read as “and,” while addition is read as “or.” Thus, we can say that Y = aB + 
AB; that is, Y occurs when either a and B are present together or A and B are 
present together. If this is a well-specified  model of the factors explaining I: 
Y = aB + AB can be further reduced by factoring to Y = B(a + A) = B. In 
other words, B is a necessary and sufficient condition to cause I: and it doesn’t 
matter whether A  is present or not. More generally, necessary  and sufficient 




Y =  A(B+C) 
B is both necessary and sufficient; 
A and B are each sufficient, but not nec- 
essary; 
Both A and B are necessary, but not suffi- 
cient; 
A is necessary, but not sufficient. 
The coding of  “left-hand-side’’ variables in a case such as the Lumber 111 
Final Determination entails identifying the objective “winner” of a particular 
argument in the proceeding, as this is indicated in the actual ITA decision. The 
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explanatory factors (coded for presence or absence with upper and lower case 
designations) are (from NI) 
1.  precedent  (P/p):  precedent  on  one’s  side  increases  the  likelihood  of 
winning; 
2. straightforward theory (T/t): a coherent, straightforward theory (e.g., an 
economic reasoning or theory) improves the likelihood of winning; 
3. evidence (E/e): having the preponderance of evidence increases the like- 
lihood of winning; 
4. ease of  exposition  (X/x):  the  likelihood  of  winning  an  argument  in- 
creases with the ease with which it can be communicated; 
and (from CT) 
5. stakes  (9s): the  likelihood  of  the  more  influential  party  winning  in- 
creases with the stakes at issue in the argument (with the success of U.S. inter- 
ests in Lumber I11 making them the most influential party). 
I  have coded the foregoing factors for a set of fourteen actual arguments 
from Lumber 111. This coding and the winning party in each argument are set 
forth in table 5.2. The basic assertions of the fourteen arguments arelo 
1. Rent theory: Canadians assert that any below-market stumpage is infra- 
marginal and does not affect lumber production. 
2.  LER as subsidy: the DoC/CFLI  asserts that LERs lower log prices to 
Canadian millers. 
3.  Market distortion: Canadians assert that LERs merely offset other coun- 
tries’ (especially Japan’s) distortive trade policies. 
4. LER price change: Canadians assert that any effect of LERs on log prices 
must be  measured  relative  to the  no-LERs equilibrium,  rather  than  current 
U.S.-Canadian price differences. 
5. General equilibrium  effects-existence:  Canadians  assert  that  general 
equilibrium effects that offset log price effects of LERs must  be accounted 
for. 
6.  General equilibrium effects-measurement:  Canadians assert that gen- 
eral equilibrium effects significantly offset log price effects of LERs. 
7.  Causation tests: Canadians assert that the DoC/CFLI has the burden of 
demonstrating empirically a “direct and discernible” impact of  the LERs on 
Canadian sawmillers’ costs. 
8. Other provinces: Canadians assert that LERs in provinces other than Brit- 
ish Columbia are not economically binding. 
9. Law of One Price: DoC/CFLI asserts that observed differences between 
U.S. and Canadian prices demonstrate the subsidizing effect of LERs. 
10. Relevant market/l: Canadians assert that any price effect of LERs does 
not “ripple” uniformly from exportable logs across all log types and the entire 
province of British Columbia. 
10. I merely state the assertions here. No opinion is expressed regarding the validity of the argu- 
ments. Table 5.2  Boolean Summary of the Attributes of Observed Winning Arguments in the US.-Canadian Lumber Dispute 
(affirmative = 1; otherwise = 0) 
Issue 
Applicable  Winner's 
Precedent  Theory  Evidence  Ease of 
Favors Winner  Large Stakes  Is Straightforward  Favors Winner  Exposition 
s=  I;s=0  T=l;t=O  E=  I;e=O  x=  I;x=0  Winner  P=  I;p=0 
Rent theory  DoCKFLI  0 
Log export restraint as  DoC/CFLI  0 
subsidy 
Market distortion  DoCKFLI  0  I 
0 
0 
0  1 
0  0 
1  0  1 
Log export restraint price  Canada  I  0  I  I  1 
change 
General equilibrium eft'ects- 
existence 




Law of One Price 
Relevant market/l 
Relevant market/2 













1  0 
0  1 
0  1 
1  0 
0  1 
1  1 
0  1 
I  0 
1  0 
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11.  Relevant market/2: Canadians assert that the ITA  erred in Preliminary 
Determination by assuming a uniform “ripple” of LER price effects across all 
logs in British Columbia. 
12. Export  preparation  costs:  Canadians  assert  that  any  comparison  be- 
tween foreign and domestic log prices must be adjusted for costs of preparing 
logs for export. 
13. Transport  costs:  Canadians  assert  that  transport  costs  should be de- 
ducted from foreign-derived log prices in any attempt to determine no-LER 
equilibrium prices in domestic British Columbian markets. 
14. Company exclusions: Canadians assert that individual mills can be ex- 
empted if they are not affected by the alleged subsidy (e.g., do not use British 
Columbian logs). 
Upon factoring table 5.2 (per above), the resulting designation of a winning 
argument is Win = pSt + PsX[tE + Ti].  In words this says that 
a winning argument before the ITA has either precedent running against it 
(p)  and a complicated theory (t)  but large stakes (5‘);  or precedent in its favor 
(P),  low stakes (s),  and easy exposition (X),  and either a combination of  a 
complicated theory (t)  but strongly supportive evidence (E)  or a simple the- 
ory (7‘) albeit weak evidence (e). 
Closer inspection of the process of factoring and reduction that produces the 
prime implicant for Win above reveals that the cases in table 5.2 that produce 
the first term (pSt)  in Win entirely are cases in which the DoC/CFLI  is the 
winning party. Similarly, the cases that produce the second term in Win (i.e., 
PsX[tE  + Ti])  entirely are cases in which the Canadians are the winners of the 
argument. From this observation come the key findings of this study: 
DoC/CFLI Wins = pSt and Canadians Win = PsX[rE + Te]. 
To  interpret these results, consider  the  above expression for “DoC/CFLI 
Wins.” The p  in pSt represents the absence of  supporting precedent  for the 
position  taken  by  the winning party. It  is only reasonably  interpreted  as an 
impediment to winning an argument. The same interpretation applies to t-the 
absence of a straightforward theory behind the position taken on the winner’s 
argument. In  short, p  and t impede  the ability of the DoC/CFLI  to win  an 
argument. Yet, when  the  stakes are large (S), the  DoC/CFLI  wins  anyway. 
We  cannot quite say  that no matter which institutional  factors (i.e., p, t, x, 
and/or e) run against the DoC/CFLI, the group wins when the stakes are large; 
the sample of issues in table 5.2 does not include cases in which the DoC/CFLI 
wins or loses with large S  and x  and/or e running against it. Nevertheless,  it 
can be said that in the cases available none occur in which institutional aspects 
of ITA proceedings block a DoC/CFLI win if the stakes in the matter are large. 
This last observation  is  the prediction  of  Capture Theory. It says, contrary 
to the New Institutionalism, that at least in the cases represented here, no evi- 
dence is found that large stakes will not permit the influential, capturing party 60  Joseph F‘.  Kalt 
from overwhelming institutional blockades such as the absence of supportive 
precedent or the absence of a noncomplicated theory for one’s argument. The 
New  Institutionalism  is not  wholly  rejected,  however. While the DoC/CFLI 
has succeeded in Lumber I11 in securing the ITKs support for tariff protection 
against Canadian forest products, the Canadian parties have won some argu- 
ments along the way.  In so doing they have tempered the level of  protection 
successfully sought before the ITA by the DoCKFLI. As noted above, the sec- 
ond term in “Win” arises from cases in which the Canadian parties prevail in 
their legal arguments before the ITA, and the Canadian parties win arguments 
when PsX[fE  + Te].  Imposing on this expression the priors that neither compli- 
cated theories (t)  nor weak evidence (e)  assists the Canadians in winning the 
argument, the prime implicant for Canadians Win reduces to 
Canadians Win = PsX[rE + Te] = PsX[E + r]. 
This result says that, within the sample of cases encompassed by table 5.2, if 
the Canadians are to win arguments before the ITA, they require not only is- 
sues for which the stakes are small (s), but also institutional help in the form 
of  supportive precedent  (P),  easy exposition (x),  and either strong evidence 
(0  or a straightforward theory (T). Apparently, the Canadians do not need to 
have everything in their favor (i.e., PsXET) to win an argument before the ITA. 
Yet even when the issue is a matter with small stakes, they need a considerable 
array of institutional factors on their side in order to win (i.e., 8  X, and E or T). 
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